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FROM STUDENT-ATHLETES TO 
EMPLOYEE-ATHLETES: WHY A “PAY FOR 
PLAY” MODEL OF COLLEGE SPORTS 
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MAKE 
EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIPS TAXABLE 
MARC EDELMAN* 
Abstract: In recent years, numerous commentators have called for the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) to relax its rules prohibiting athlete 
pay. This movement to allow athletes to share in the revenues of college sports 
arises from the belief that college athletes sacrifice too much time, personal au-
tonomy, and physical health to justify their lack of pay. It further criticizes the 
NCAA’s “no pay” rules for keeping the revenues derived from college sports “in 
the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and coaches.” Never-
theless, opponents of “pay for play” contend that several problems will emerge 
from lifting the NCAA’s “no pay” rules. One problem, opponents argue, is that 
granting college athletes the legal status of “employees” would convert the ath-
letes’ tax-exempt scholarships into taxable income—a result that may offset any 
economic benefits of “pay for play.” Their argument, however, is not necessarily 
accurate. This article discusses the economic and legal landscape of big-time 
college sports, and introduces the fallacious legal argument that “pay for play” 
would saddle college athletes with substantial tax liability related to their educa-
tional scholarships. This article then provides a brief primer on the U.S. tax 
code—exploring sections of the code that may allow for paid college athletes to 
enjoy a tax-free education. Finally, this article explains that proper tax planning 
may allow colleges to pay their athletes without requiring the athletes to pay 
taxes on their educational scholarships. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, numerous commentators have called for the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) to relax its rules prohibiting ath-
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lete pay.1 This movement to allow athletes to share in the revenues of col-
lege sports arises from the belief that college athletes sacrifice too much 
time,2 personal autonomy,3 and physical health to justify their lack of pay.4 
It further criticizes the NCAA’s “no pay” rules for keeping the revenues 
derived from college sports “in the hands of a select few administrators, 
athletic directors, and coaches.”5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643 [https://perma.
cc/4VWN-TH7H]; Jay Mariotti, Pay College Athletes, Duck the Slime, S.F. EXAMINER (Sept. 9, 
2015, 9:39 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/pay-college-athletes-duck-the-slime [https://perma.
cc/7LSP-9UQA]; Joe Nocera, A Way to Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/sports/a-way-to-start-paying-college-athletes.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/PZ7X-QGHX]; Andy Schwarz, But Nobody Even Makes Any Money on College Sports, 
SLATE (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2014/01/paying_
college_athletes_a_point_by_point_evisceration_of_the_ridiculous.html [https://perma.cc/R6VC-
8UHY]; Marc Edelman, The Case for Paying College Athletes, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/01/06/ncaa-college-athletes-should-be-paid [https://
perma.cc/JV7Z-PWLE]; Michael Wilbon, College Athletes Deserve to Be Paid, ESPN (July 18, 
2011), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6778847/college-athletes-deserve-paid [https://
perma.cc/4H5N-NP76]. 
 2 See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA’s 
No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 61, 77 (2013) (not-
ing that the average Division I college football player spends more time playing and preparing for 
football than the typical full-time hourly worker); see also Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union 
for an Invisible Labor Market: College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 1077, 1099 (citing to an NCAA study that showed the average Division I college football 
player devoted 43.3 hours per week to his sport). 
 3 See, e.g., Mark Dent et al., Do Colleges Drop the Ball with Student Athletes?, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (May 31, 2014, 10:58 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/college/2014/06/
01/Do-colleges-drop-the-ball-with-student-athletes/stories/201406010120 [https://web.archive.org/
web/20170131193542/http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/college/2014/06/01/Do-colleges-drop-
the-ball-with-student-athletes/stories/201406010120] (explaining how one college football player, 
Kain Colter, was discouraged from taking pre-med courses over the concern that they would inter-
fere with football). 
 4 See Sara Ganim, Unnecessary Roughness? Players Question NCAA’s Record on Concussions, 
CNN (Oct. 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/10/us/ncaa-concussions 
[https://perma.cc/34V2-BRMY] (discussing the “devastating effects” of concussions on some 
college athletes); Jake New, Wary of Concussions, College Athletes Choose Early Retirement, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 18, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/18/wary-
concussions-college-athletes-choose-early-retirement [https://web.archive.org/web/20160203182600/
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/18/wary-concussions-college-athletes-choose-early-
retirement] (explaining how unpaid college athletes risk substantial long-term harm from repeated 
concussions); Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/news/united-states/21612160-pressure-grows-let-student-athletes-share-fruits-their-
own-labours-players-0 [https://perma.cc/74NM-HXQJ] (noting that college athletes risk serious 
injuries, especially “head-clashing American footballers”). 
 5 Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 35 
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 861, 864 (2002); see also Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra 
note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that “[a]cross all sports, college athletics revenues are 
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Nevertheless, opponents of “pay for play” cite to numerous problems 
that they believe will emerge from lifting the NCAA’s “no pay” rules.6 
Among these problems, opponents argue, is that granting college athletes 
the legal status of “employees” would convert the athletes’ tax-exempt 
scholarships into taxable income—a result that may offset any economic 
benefits of “pay for play.”7 
This article explains why a “pay for play” model of college sports 
would not necessarily require college athletes to pay taxes on their educa-
tional scholarships. Part I of this article discusses the economic and legal 
landscape of big-time college sports, and introduces the fallacious legal ar-
gument that “pay for play” would saddle college athletes with substantial 
tax liability related to their educational scholarships.8 Part II provides a 
brief primer on the U.S. tax code—exploring sections of the code that may 
allow for paid college athletes to enjoy a tax-free education.9 Finally, Part 
III explores how, with proper tax planning, colleges may provide their ath-
letes with bona fide employment contracts that are unlikely to risk the tax-
exempt status of the athletes’ college scholarships.10 
                                                                                                                           
$10.5 billion a year, more than the NFL generates” but that “[l]ess than 30% of that goes towards 
scholarships and financial aid for players”). 
 6 See 160 Cong. Rec. S2362–66 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2014) (statement of Sen. Alexander and 
Sen. Burr) (providing a detailed discussion of the opposition to “pay for play”); Kristi Dosh, The 
Problems with Paying College Athletes, FORBES (Jun. 9, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/the-problems-with-paying-college-athletes/#1ef4cc112c5d [https://
web.archive.org/web/20161205124047/http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/the-
problems-with-paying-college-athletes/#351b99c8bcd4] (arguing that paying college athletes 
would lead to the need for colleges to receive greater tax subsidies); John R. Thelin, Here’s Why 
We Shouldn’t Pay College Athletes, TIME: MONEY (Mar. 1, 2016), http://time.com/money/4241
077/why-we-shouldnt-pay-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/N9VT-5LN7] (concluding that pay-
ing college athletes would be against their interests given the tax ramifications). 
 7 See Thelin, supra note 6; see also Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS Comm’r, to Richard 
Burr, U.S. Senator (Apr. 9, 2014) (on file with the Internal Revenue Service), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SBZ-HG9V] (explaining and rejecting Senator Burr’s 
perspective); Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Alexander, 
Burr: Unionization Is No Sol. for Coll. Athletes (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.help.senate.gov/chair/
newsroom/press/alexander-burr-unionization-is-no-solution-for-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/
K24A-N78Q] (referencing Senator Burr’s argument that if college athletes are employees, they 
may have tax obligations on their income). 
8 See infra notes 11–62 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 63–148 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 149–197 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 
A. Historic Treatment of U.S. College Athletes 
The college sports industry represents a more than eleven billion dollar 
U.S. enterprise.11 At present, over fifty U.S. colleges generate upwards of 
seventy million dollars per year in athletic revenues.12 Meanwhile, twenty-
eight colleges generate annual athletic revenues that exceed $100 million.13 
Most colleges with big-time sports programs focus their efforts on generat-
ing revenues in two sports: football and men’s basketball.14 In these sports, 
the star athletes devote upwards of forty hours per week to team travel, 
play, and practice.15 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See 2015–16 NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160428093619/http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/] (last visit-
ed Aug. 16, 2017); see also Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in 
College Sports, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 489 (2015) (stating that the NCAA’s annual revenues stand 
at sixteen billion dollars per year); Jay D. Lonick, Bargaining with the Real Boss: How the Joint-
Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-Athlete Unionization to the NCAA as an Employer, 15 
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 135, 138 (2015) (estimating the revenue generated by the college sports 
industry at twelve billion dollars per year).  
 12 See 2015–16 NCAA Finances, supra note 11. 
 13 See id. Not all college athletic programs are profitable, and, according to one source, public 
universities have “pumped more than $10.3 billion in mandatory student fees and other subsidies 
into their sports programs.” See Brad Wolverton et al., Sports at Any Cost, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 15, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/ncaa/sports-at-any-cost [https://perma.
cc/CWA3-5KAQ]. 
 14 See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills [https://perma.cc/9DZU-
24P2] (explaining that football is the number one revenue producing sport for college athletic 
programs while men’s basketball is number two). The primary sources of athletic revenues include 
ticket sales, alumni donations, brand merchandising, and media rights. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. 
Athletes Players Ass’n (Nw. Univ. II), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *4 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (explaining that revenues from big-time college football emerge from “gate receipts, con-
cession and merchandise sales, and broadcasting contracts”); College Athletic Revenues and Ex-
penses - 2008, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/ncaa/revenue [https://perma.cc/QN27-23VN] (last visit-
ed Apr. 21, 2016). See generally Amber Jorgensen, Why Collegiate Athletes Could Have the 
NCAA, Et Al. Singing a Different Tune, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 367 (2015) (explaining 
that “[r]ising television and marketing rights fees have primarily contributed to the economic 
growth of the NCAA and its member institutions over the past 25 years, as together such fees 
accounted for 81% of the NCAA’s total revenue in 2012”); Hobson & Rich, supra (stating that 
“[b]ig-time college sports departments are making more money than ever before, thanks to sky-
rocketing television contracts, endorsement and licensing deals, and big-spending donors”). 
 15 See Edelman, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that the typical Division I college football player 
devotes on average over forty hours per week to his sport—more time than the typical U.S. worker 
spends practicing his profession); see also LeRoy, supra note 2, at 1099 (noting that “a self-study 
performed by the NCAA in 2011” found that “Division I [college] football players [devoted] an 
average of 43.3 hours per week to their sport”). 
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If U.S. colleges were for-profit entities, the most successful football and 
men’s basketball programs would produce high shareholder distributions.16 
Because the NCAA consists of exclusively non-profit colleges, however, the 
collegiate sports enterprise operates subject to a “non-distribution con-
straint.”17 This means that colleges with big-time football and men’s basket-
ball programs either reinvest their revenues into other college programs, or 
they allocate their revenues as windfall payments to quasi-shareholders such 
as school administrators, athletic directors, and coaches.18 
Given the revenues brought in by these programs, one might expect 
colleges to allocate some of their athletic revenues to the athletes.19 Never-
theless, the NCAA Principle of Amateurism disallows colleges from paying 
athletes and threatens to ban any NCAA member college that engages in 
“pay for play.”20 Thus, pursuant to the NCAA’s bylaws, no NCAA member 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See 2015–16 NCAA Finances, supra note 11 (showing total revenues and net revenues of 
big-time college athletic departments, after the subsidies to cover the costs of operating non-
revenue sports). 
 17 Hobson & Rich, supra note 14 (quoting sports economist Dan Rascher about how the lack 
of shareholders contribute to college athletic departments’ spending patterns); Gordon Winston, 
Why Can’t a College Be More Like a Firm, CHANGE, May 1997, at 34 (discussing the impact of 
the non-distribution restraint in higher education); cf. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the NCAA as “a member-driven, unincorporated 
association of 1121 colleges and universities. It is divided into three divisions—Division I, II, and 
III—based roughly on the size of the schools and their athletic programs”). 
 18 Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the 
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the 
Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2014); see also Nicholas Fram & T. Ward 
Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 
BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1020 (2012) (“Unable to offer financial inducements to players, athletic de-
partments invest heavily in marquee coaches, whose reputations can ensure the recruitment of top-
level talent.”); Ellen J. Staurowsky, A Radical Proposal: Title IX Has No Role in College Sport 
Pay-For-Play Discussions, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 575, 578 (2012) (“While college-player 
labor costs are essentially zero, compensation packages for top-tier college football and men’s 
basketball coaches are competitive or exceed those of coaches working in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) and NFL”). See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 14 (explaining that 
“[c]olleges generally treat athletic departments as stand-alone organizations, free to spend every 
dollar they earn”). 
 19 See Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, supra note 4 (highlighting the unusual nature 
of the college sports business model in the United States, and the treatment of college athletes as 
celebrities despite not allowing them to “share the fruits of their own [labor]”); cf. Maxwell Stra-
chan, Mitch Daniels Says NCAA Needs Serious Reform to Head Off Congress and Courts, HUFF-
INGTON POST (May 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/13/mitch-daniels-ncaa-
division-i-sports_n_7274248.html [https://perma.cc/PN6L-3XH3] (explaining that the President of 
Purdue University, Mitch Daniels, “believes the term ‘college basketball’” is a “misnomer” and 
that the teams are really “pseudo-professional teams attached to universities”). 
 20 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2017–2018 DIVISION I MANUAL § 2.9 (2017) 
(stating that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation 
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be 
derived”); see also Edelman, supra note 2, at 64–65 (explaining that “the NCAA is ‘the dominant 
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college would dare publicly offer any financial benefits to its athletes be-
yond a tax-exempt scholarship to cover the costs of tuition, books, and 
room and board.21 
B. Three Approaches to Reforming College Sports 
Based on the colossal disparity between the revenues derived from col-
lege sports and the college athletes’ compensation, there is an emerging 
movement to reform the financial aspects of collegiate sports.22 Some advo-
cates of reform have called for the NCAA to make voluntary changes to its 
Principle of Amateurism.23 Others have explored the potential for players to 
unionize under federal labor laws.24 Meanwhile, a third group of reformers 
has called for athletes to challenge the NCAA’s “no pay” rules under federal 
antitrust laws.25 
                                                                                                                           
trade association’ of American colleges that compete in intercollegiate sports,” and that “[i]t com-
prises approximately twelve hundred member schools that participate in ninety-five different ac-
tive athletic conferences”); Edelman, supra note 5, at 864–68 (providing a brief history of colleges 
attempting to limit athlete benefits to just a free undergraduate education). 
 21 See Marc Edelman The NCAA’s “Death Penalty” Sanction—Reasonable Self-Governance 
or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise? 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385, 392–93 (2014) (ex-
plaining the NCAA’s “death penalty” sanction and how it generates enormous financial incentives 
for members to avoid any detectable means of violating major NCAA rules, including the Princi-
ple of Amateurism). 
 22 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But see 160 Cong. Rec. S2362–66 (arguing this 
disparity is not quite what it seems based on the notion that “a college degree adds $1 million to 
[one’s expected] earnings during a lifetime”). 
 23 See Strachan, supra note 19 (quoting Purdue University president Mitch Daniels arguing 
that the NCAA needs to make serious reforms to the compensation structure of college athletes 
before courts and Congress order changes); infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Joe Nocera, Unionized College Athletes?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/01/opinion/nocera-unionized-college-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/D9H7-YC5U]; Kenneth Quin-
nell, 8 Reasons Why College Athletes Need a Union, AFL-CIO (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/
Organizing-Bargaining/8-Reasons-College-Athletes-Need-a-Union [https://perma.cc/3AER-WA4W]; infra 
notes 33–39 and accompanying text; see also Clay Travis, The NCAA Needs a College Union to Negotiate 
With, OUTKICK THE COVERAGE (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.outkickthecoverage.com/the-ncaa-needs-a-
college-union-to-negotiate-with-081114 [https://perma.cc/U4VF-N8X4] (arguing that the NCAA collec-
tively bargaining against a college athlete union presents a better outcome than the NCAA risking anti-
trust liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 25 See Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.
espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaa-
amateur-model [https://perma.cc/FV8E-2RKZ] (quoting attorney as stating that “‘[i]n no other 
business . . . would it ever be suggested that the people who are providing the essential services 
work for free’”); infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
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1. Voluntary NCAA Reform 
Thus far, attempts to reform the NCAA without resorting to litigation 
have achieved limited to moderate success.26 A recent example of such re-
form was the NCAA’s decision to abandon its rules limiting the amount of 
food that colleges may provide to their athletes.27 This reform emerged after 
University of Connecticut men’s basketball player Shabazz Napier exposed 
the hypocrisy of the NCAA’s rules on food limits to the media just hours 
before playing in the 2014 men’s basketball national championship game.28 
Napier’s statement that he had experienced “hungry nights” at school went 
viral due, in part, to the absurdity of the NCAA earning nearly one billion 
dollars from men’s basketball television revenues, while limiting how much 
food colleges may provide to their basketball players.29 
Another voluntary NCAA reform was the NCAA’s 2011 decision to 
increase the maximum permissible scholarship amounts for college athletes 
by two thousand dollars—a decision that somewhat reduced the shortfall 
between the NCAA’s scholarship maximum and the actual cost of attending 
college.30 Some commentators attribute this change to social activism by 
college athletes and more liberal-minded coaches.31 Others, however, at-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 27 See NCAA Committee Approves Expanded Meal Allowances for Athletes, NCAA (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2014-04-15/ncaa-committee-approves-expanded-
meal-allowances-athletes [https://perma.cc/459J-LY4R] (stating that the NCAA Legislative Coun-
cil had decided to allow NCAA Division I athletes to receive unlimited meals and snacks from 
their colleges in “conjunction with their athletics participation”). 
 28 See Mike Singer, Connecticut’s Shabazz Napier: ‘We Do Have Hungry Nights,’ CBS SPORTS 
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/connecticuts-shabazz-napier-we-
do-have-hungry-nights [https://web.archive.org/web/20170625034618/http://www.cbssports.com/
college-basketball/news/connecticuts-shabazz-napier-we-do-have-hungry-nights]; see also Kevin 
Trahan, NCAA Allows ‘Unlimited Meals’ (Days After Shabazz Napier Claimed Hunger), SB NA-
TION (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/4/15/5618236/new-
ncaa-rules-meals-snacks-SNACKS [https://perma.cc/3KGC-PUTN]. 
 29 See Singer, supra note 28; see also CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14 
Year Agreement, NCAA (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-
21/cbs-sports-turner-broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year-agreement [https://perma.cc/7WVD-NQ32] 
(discussing the NCAA’s fourteen year, $10.8 billion television contract to broadcast the annual 
March men’s basketball tournament). 
 30 See NCAA Panel Approves Major Changes, ESPN (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.espn.com/
college-sports/story/_/id/7156548/ncaa-panel-approves-major-scholarship-rules-changes [https://
perma.cc/6Y87-AH9F] (discussing the NCAA’s decision to allow conferences to vote to provide 
college athletes with two thousand dollars in “spending money” in addition their scholarships, and 
the recognition by Big Ten Commissioner Jim Delany that this amount still leaves college athletes 
with a shortfall). 
 31 See Bruce Pascoe, UA Athletes Can Expect About $1,000, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://tucson.com/sports/college/wildcats/ua-athletes-can-expect-about/article_952dbdaf-3900-5b02-
b323-14cc61cc2d7d.html [https://perma.cc/YS4T-7LNZ] (explaining that in the days leading up 
to the NCAA’s favorable vote to increase the permissible scholarship amount for college athletes 
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tribute the change more to the desire of elite colleges to compete more fa-
vorably in college athlete recruiting markets.32 
2. The Unionizing of College Athletes 
A second approach to improving the financial status of college athletes 
entails the unionizing of athletes for the purposes of collective bargaining 
over the mandatory terms and conditions of employment—including hours, 
wages, and general working conditions.33 The most notable attempt to un-
ionize college athletes occurred in 2014, when the starting quarterback of 
Northwestern University’s men’s football team, Kain Colter, attempted to 
convince his teammates to unionize.34 Region 13 of the National Labor Re-
lations Board (“NLRB”) ultimately recognized that Northwestern Universi-
ty football players were “employees” under the National Labor Relations 
Act.35 Nevertheless, the Board Commissioners refused to assert jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                           
by the lesser of two thousand dollars or the amount needed to meet the full cost of college attend-
ance, many college athletes, including University of Arizona wide receiver David Roberts, signed 
a petition requesting a $3,200 increase); see also Jon Nyatawa & Rich Kaipust, Nebraska Football 
Notes: Pelini in Favor of NCAA’s Actions to Assist Athletes, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 28, 
2011, 2011 WLNR 22250322 (discussing University of Nebraska football coach Bo Pelini’s sup-
port for increasing the scholarship limits for college athletes). 
 32 See generally Elton Alexander, NCAA Will Allow Schools to Provide Spending Money to 
Student-Athletes, PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 28, 2011, 5:01AM), http://www.cleveland.com/osu/
2011/10/ncaa_approves_spending_money_f.html [https://perma.cc/2LET-NL58] (explaining how 
the two thousand dollar scholarship increase is a neutral, or perhaps even positive, change from 
the perspective of Ohio State University—a school with an athletic department that operates at a 
surplus and wishes to continue recruiting the most elite college football and men’s basketball 
players). 
 33 See Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons Learned from 
Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2017) (explaining that “Congress passed the [National Labor Rela-
tions Act] in May 1935 to grant private employees the right to self-organize and engage in . . . 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 674–75 
(1981) (“Although parties are free to bargain about any legal subject, Congress has limited the 
mandate or duty to bargain to matters of ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.’”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). 
 34 See Edelman, supra note 33, at 1635 (discussing the efforts to create a college athlete play-
ers’ union among Northwestern University grant-in-aid football players). 
 35 See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (Nw. Univ. I), No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 
1246914, at *1 (N.L.R.B., Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Nw. Univ. II, 2015 
WL 4882656, at *1 (Aug. 17, 2015). Since the NLRB decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit rejected classifying athletes on the University of Pennsylvania women’s track and 
field team as employees for purposes of the right to minimum wage under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 291–93. Although the Berger decision involved the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and not the National Labor Relations Act, the ruling is somewhat troubling with 
regard to the future classification of big-time college athletes as employees because the majority 
opinion references all “student athletes,” and not just those participating in women’s track and 
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over these particular football players due to a concern that doing so would 
create labor instability throughout the Big Ten athletic conference.36 
The NLRB’s decision to deny jurisdiction over the Northwestern Uni-
versity football players, however, does not foreclose the possibility of the 
NLRB asserting jurisdiction over a different bargaining unit of revenue-
generating college athletes.37 One alternative bargaining unit that might re-
ceive more favorable treatment from the NLRB would include all of the 
football or men’s basketball players in an athletic conference that includes 
multiple private colleges.38 Another potential bargaining unit could include 
all of the private Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) football and Division I 
men’s basketball players across the entire United States.39 
3. Reform Ordered by Antitrust Law 
Finally, some college athletes have attempted to improve their economic 
status by challenging the NCAA’s “no-pay” rules as illegal restraints of 
trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act.40 To date, there have been three no-
table labor-side antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA that seek to change the 
financial relationship between colleges and their football and men’s basket-
ball players.41 The first lawsuit, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, was brought by the plaintiffs in 2009 and alleged that the NCAA’s 
members violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring “to fix the 
price of former student athletes’ images at zero and to boycott former stu-
                                                                                                                           
field. Id. at 293. Judge Hamilton’s concurring opinion in Berger seems to take a more realistic 
view, suggesting as a note of caution that the non-treatment of the University of Pennsylvania 
women’s track team as employees may be based in part on that “Penn does not offer athletic 
scholarships” and “track and field is not a ‘revenue’ sport at Penn or any other school.” Id. at 294 
(Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 36 Nw. Univ. II, 2015 WL 4882656, at *5. More broadly than these particular qualms related 
to the nature of Northwestern University’s conference affiliation, the NLRB cautioned that “of the 
roughly 125 colleges and universities that participate in FBS football, all but 17 are state-run insti-
tutions,” that lie outside the scope of the NLRB’s jurisdiction. Id. 
 37 See Edelman, supra note 33, at 1643. 
 38 See id. (citing Nw. Univ. II, 2015 WL 4882656, at *6). 
 39 Id. at 1649–50. A third potential bargaining unit might include all FBS football and Divi-
sion I men’s basketball players at both public and private colleges, operating under the theory that 
the NCAA is a joint employer of all college athletes and thus even public colleges fall within the 
NLRB’s jurisdiction. See id. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit in Berger seemed to reject the 
notion that the NCAA was a joint employer of college athletes. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (hold-
ing that the relationship between University of Pennsylvania college athletes and the NCAA was 
too attenuated to establish employer liability). 
 40 See infra notes 42–51 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 42–51 and accompanying text. 
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dent athletes in the collegiate licensing market.”42 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s injunction that prevent-
ed the NCAA from sanctioning colleges that provide their athletes with 
scholarships valued at up to the full cost of their college attendance.43 
A second lawsuit, Alston v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, was 
filed in 2014 and alleged that the NCAA and its five largest athletic confer-
ences conspired to violate antitrust laws by capping the value of college 
athlete scholarships below the athletes’ actual cost of attendance.44 The 
plaintiffs in Alston sought not only to enjoin NCAA member colleges from 
limiting scholarship amounts (a remedy similar to the remedy requested in 
O’Bannon), but also to receive damages from the NCAA for past antitrust 
wrongdoing.45 In February of 2017, the class of plaintiffs in Alston and the 
NCAA reached a historic settlement.46 
A third antitrust lawsuit, Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
was filed in 2014 and sought to fully overturn the NCAA’s “no pay” rules 
that “plac[e] a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to [college] 
athletes for their services.”47 In contrast to O’Bannon and Alston, the Jen-
                                                                                                                           
 42 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (O’Bannon I), No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 
445190, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); see Joseph Liu, Sports Merchandising, Publicity Rights, 
and the Missing Role of the Sports Fan, 52 B.C. L. REV. 493, 511 (2011) (describing the 
O’Bannon case’s conflict over who owned college football and basketball players’ publicity 
rights: the players or the schools). 
 43 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2015). Prior to the decision, the NCAA capped the amount of athletic scholarships at member 
schools at a “full grant in aid” rather than “cost of attendance”—leaving college athletes with 
between a $2000 and $6000 annual shortfall resulting from transportation and reasonable personal 
expenses. See Fram & Frampton, supra note 18, at 1022 (describing the shortfall at some institu-
tions as “more than $6000”); William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern Univer-
sity, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (estimating the short-
fall at nearly two thousand dollars).  
 44 Complaint at 108–13, Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No: 4:14-cv-01011 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Alston Complaint]; Justin Sievert, The Forgotten Antitrust Case: How an 
NCAA Loss in Alston Could Impact College Athletics, SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.
sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/news/ncaa-antitrust-case-shawne-alston-effects-college-athletics/
1uro6chmw5naj1o6n15opblfmy [https://perma.cc/P746-AM58]. 
 45 Alston Complaint, supra note 44 at 106–07, 115; Sievert, supra note 44.  
46 Michael McCann, NCAA Reaches Settlement in Grant-in-Aid Class Action, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/02/04/shawne-alston-grant-aid-
class-action-lawsuit-ncaa-settlement https://web.archive.org/web/20170217035847/https://www.si.
com/college-football/2017/02/04/shawne-alston-grant-aid-class-action-lawsuit-ncaa-settlement]. 
The settlement would require the NCAA to pay a total of $208.7 million to a class of approximate-
ly forty thousand former Division I football, men’s basketball and women’s basketball players 
who have played since March 2010. Id. A class member who played one of those sports for four 
years could expect to receive, on average, $6,763. Id. 
 47 Complaint at 2, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. Mar. 
17, 2014) [hereinafter Jenkins Complaint]. The suit was later re-filed in the Northern District of 
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kins lawsuit did not seek to simply recover the true costs of attending col-
lege.48 Rather, the lawsuit is attempting to create an entirely free labor mar-
ket for NCAA colleges to hire athletes.49 In other words, the Jenkins lawsuit 
seeks to obtain a labor market to recruit college athletes comparable to the 
market that already exists to hire non-unionized college professors and non-
unionized research assistants.50 If successful, this would mark a substantial 
departure from past practices in college sports.51 
C. Political, Media, and Academic Perspectives on the Tax  
Implications of College Sports Reform 
Among the many public policy issues that emerge from transitioning 
college sports into a “pay for play” model, one issue that has received sub-
stantial attention involves the tax implications that “pay for play” may have 
on college athletes’ scholarships.52 Not surprisingly, some of the staunchest 
opponents of “pay for play” have attempted to use the purported negative 
tax consequences as a red herring in the argument about whether college 
athletes deserve to share in the fruits of their labor.53 
Among politicians, one of the most outspoken critics of “pay for play” 
is U.S. Senator Richard Burr (R–North Carolina), a former scholarship 
football player at Wake Forest University who believes the United Steel-
workers Union pressured “misguided college football players” into seeking 
to unionize.54 Senator Burr recently penned a letter to the Internal Revenue 
                                                                                                                           
California. See Second Amended Complaint, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-
cv-02758-CW (N.D. Cal. Feb 3, 2015). 
 48 See Jenkins Complaint, supra note 47, at 1–4. 
 49 Id. The argument advanced in the Jenkins suit mimics one that I had advanced in a law 
review article in 2013. See Edelman, supra note 2, at 64 (concluding that “[i]t is not just the outer 
fringes of the NCAA rules that violate antitrust law: it is the whole shebang”). 
 50 Cf. Marc Edelman, How Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and the Hope for Tangible Change, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 809, 823 (2016) (com-
paring the desired result of the Jenkins lawsuit to the free market that already exists among colleg-
es, competing for professors’ services). 
 51 See Associated Press, NCAA President: Not A Good Idea, ESPN (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.
espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9682086/ncaa-budge-paying-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/
C6KN-Z46N] (quoting NCAA President Mark Emmert as stating that, despite the ongoing litiga-
tion against the NCAA’s no-pay rules, “[o]ne thing that sets the fundamental tone is there’s very 
few members and, virtually no university president, that think it’s a good idea to convert student-
athletes into paid employees”). 
 52 See, e.g., Thelin, supra note 6. 
 53 See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Players Could Get Big Tax Bill, ESPN (Mar. 27, 2014), http://
www.espn.com/espn/print?id=10683398 [https://perma.cc/9SUC-GWVD].  
 54 See 160 Cong. Rec. S2362–66 (providing the extensive statements of Senator Lamar Alex-
ander (R-Tennessee) and Senator Richard Burr (R-North Carolina) in opposition to athletes union-
izing and “pay for play” in college sports). 
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Service (“IRS”), arguing that any college athlete who obtains the classifica-
tion of an “employee” should immediately lose the tax-exempt status of his 
college scholarship.55 John Koskinen, the Commissioner of the IRS, how-
ever, disagreed.56 
Similarly, among sports journalists, ESPN writer Darren Rovell has 
noted that “pay for play” could harm the tax-exempt status of college ath-
letes’ scholarships.57 In one ESPN article, Rovell quoted an accountant in 
private practice for the proposition that if college athletes were to be reclas-
sified as employees, “‘[t]he IRS may be able to make the argument that the 
scholarship is really payment for services . . . and is now taxable to the ath-
lete.’”58 The accountant’s opinion, however, focused only on a single sec-
tion of the tax code and not on the code in its entirety.59 
Meanwhile, among college professors, University of Kentucky Educa-
tion Policy professor John R. Thelin has argued that if college athletes were to 
receive salaries rather than scholarships, the athletes would become worse off 
economically because they would lose the ability to obtain college tuition on 
a tax-exempt basis.60 Similarly, professors Kathryn Kisska-Schulze and Adam 
Epstein claim in a recent Akron Law Review article that the IRS and courts 
“may categorize at least some scholarship athletes as employees of their insti-
tutions in the future, which may cultivate a new era in the taxing of qualified 
scholarships under federal income tax law.”61 None of these conclusions, 
however, consider the full nuance of the tax code.62 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS Comm’r, to Richard Burr, U.S. Senator, supra note 
7 (explaining and rejecting Senator Burr’s perspective); see also Press Release, U.S. Senate 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, supra note 7 (referencing Senator Burr’s college 
football experience at Wake Forest University); Lawmakers Ask for Northwestern Football Union 
Ruling to Be Overturned, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Jul. 4, 2014, 2014 WLNR 18206332 
(discussing amicus brief signed by six Republican lawmakers, including Senator Burr, seeking to 
convince the Commissioners of the NLRB to overturn Region 13’s ruling that the Northwestern 
University football players constituted employees under labor law). 
 56 See Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS Comm’r, to Richard Burr, U.S. Senator, supra note 7. 
 57 See Rovell, supra note 53 (arguing that even though Region 13 of the NLRB granted juris-
diction over the Northwestern University football players, “potential tax implications alone could 
kill the idea”). 
 58 See id. (quoting tax accountant Garrett Higgins). 
 59 See id. (noting that the tax analysis was exclusively based on § 117 of the U.S. tax code, 
which relates to “qualified scholarships,” while there are several sections of the tax code that ar-
guably apply). 
 60 Thelin, supra note 6. 
 61 Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, Northwestern, O’Bannon and the Future: Culti-
vating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships, 49 AKRON L. REV. 771, 775 (2016). 
 62 See infra notes 62–148 and accompanying text (discussing sections of the tax code that 
were ignored entirely by the aforementioned analyses). 
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II. A BASIC PRIMER ON FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 
Despite the simple, widespread argument that paying college athletes 
makes educational scholarships taxable, a review of the U.S. tax code indi-
cates that numerous different code sections may direct otherwise.63 Section 
A of this Part will discuss U.S. tax law generally and explain the fundamen-
tal premise of “gross income.”64 Section B of this Part will explain the vari-
ous reductions an individual may take from their “gross income.”65 
A. An Introduction to U.S. Tax Law and the Definitions of  
“Gross Income” and Taxable Income 
Before the IRS can compute one’s tax liability, the Internal Revenue 
Code (“IRC”) first requires a computation of one’s “gross income.”66 The 
IRC defines “gross income” to include any “income from whatever source 
derived”—irrespective of whether the income is provided in the form of 
cash or property.67 
The tax code then lowers one’s taxable income based upon three types 
of reductions: exclusions, deductions, and credits.68 A tax exclusion reduces 
the amount that a taxpayer must report as gross income.69 For example, the 
code allows a taxpayer to exclude certain types of in-kind benefits from 
gross income because they are difficult to measure.70 Meanwhile, taxpayers 
may exclude other types of benefits, such as 401(k) retirement plans, as a 
means to further a public policy that promotes retirement savings.71 
Similarly, a tax deduction is an expense that an individual may subtract 
from his or her “gross income.”72 Taxpayers typically have a choice between 
accepting a “standard deduction” or accepting an aggregate of all of their line 
item deductions.73 Some examples of deductible line-items include property 
taxes and mortgage interest, state and local income taxes, charitable contri-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See generally I.R.C. §§ 1–1564 (2012) (income taxes). 
64 See infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 80–148 and accompanying text. 
 66 See I.R.C. § 61(a). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Rick Lindquist, Tax Exclusions vs. Tax Deductions vs. Tax Credits in Healthcare, ZANE 
BENEFITS: SMALL BUS. EMP. BENEFITS AND HR BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.zanebenefits.
com/blog/bid/252608/tax-exclusions-vs-tax-deductions-vs-tax-credits-in-healthcare [https://perma.
cc/S9N5-RRP5]. 
 69 See I.R.C. §§ 101–140; Lindquist, supra note 68. 
 70 See I.R.C. §§ 101–140; Lindquist, supra note 68. 
 71 See I.R.C. § 401(k); Lindquist, supra note 68. 
 72 See I.R.C. §§ 151–224; Lindquist, supra note 68.  
 73 See Lindquist, supra note 68. 
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butions, and medical expenses not covered by insurance to the extent that 
they exceed a particular threshold.74 
Finally, a tax credit is a “dollar-for-dollar reduction of an individual’s 
tax liability.” 75 A tax credit is different from a tax deduction in that “[i]f the 
tax credit is refundable, individuals can receive its full amount even if they 
do not have any income tax to offset.”76 Many tax credits, however, are lim-
ited to individuals with earned income below a certain threshold.77 For ex-
ample the earned income tax credit “is geared toward people with low to 
moderate income levels.”78 In 2016, the credit allowed for a tax savings of 
up to $6,269, with this amount varying based on income level, filing basis, 
and number of dependents.79 
B. Notable Reductions from “Gross Income” 
When reviewing the entirety of the U.S. tax code, there are several 
possible ways for individuals to realize a tax savings on either their free 
receipt or purchase of an education.80 
1. Section 117: Qualified Scholarship Exemption 
First, Section 117 of the IRC is the section of the code that college ath-
letes traditionally have relied upon when electing not to declare their schol-
arships as gross income.81 This section of the tax code excludes from gross 
income the receipt of “qualified scholarships,” which are contingency-free 
educational grants and fellowships.82 To constitute a “qualified scholar-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See I.R.C. §§ 163–164, 170, 213; Lindquist, supra note 68. 
 75 Lindquist, supra note 68. See generally What Is the Earned Income Tax Credit?, TAX POL’Y 
CTR. http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-credit-eitc [https://
perma.cc/P56E-JSQ6] (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).  
 76 Lindquist, supra note 68. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Jennifer Woods, The Top 10 Tax Credits That Should Be on Your Radar, CNBC (Apr. 
11, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/11/the-top-10-tax-credits-that-should-be-on-your-radar.
html [https://perma.cc/6JK6-6KE8]. 
 79 TAX POL’Y CTR., EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS, 1975–2016 (2016), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/taxfacts/content/PDF/historical_eitc_parameters.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9P2-L88P]; Woods, supra note 78. 
 80 See infra notes 81–148 and accompanying text. 
 81 See I.R.C. § 117(a)–(d) (qualified scholarships); see also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 
(concluding that recipients of athletic scholarships do not need to pay income tax on these scholar-
ships as long as the scholarships are guaranteed irrespective of whether the recipient ultimately 
chooses to play his or her sport). 
 82 See I.R.C. § 117(a)–(d); cf Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 61, at 783 (explaining 
that the “qualified scholarship” exemption for gross income first appeared in a U.S. tax code in 
1954). 
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ship,” a particular payment or in-kind benefit must cover the tuition and 
fees required for college enrollment, books, supplies or equipment.83 In ad-
dition, the scholarship’s primary purpose must be “to further the education 
and training of the recipient in his individual capacity” rather than in the 
recipient’s employee capacity.84 
The outer contours of what constitutes a “qualified scholarship” have 
emerged from federal case law.85 Most notably, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
in its 1969 decision Bingler v. Johnson that a scholarship provided by one’s 
employer subject to the express promise to work for the employer upon grad-
uation did not constitute a “qualified scholarship.”86 This is because a schol-
arship of this nature includes an express condition to perform contemporane-
ous or subsequent work for an employer in exchange for the free education.87 
In other words, the underlying scholarship is more akin to a contractual ar-
rangement than a gift.88 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See I.R.C. § 117(a)–(c) (noting that the scholarship amount may not include room and 
board); see also Justin Morehouse, When Play Becomes Work: Are College Athletes Employees?, 
TAX ANALYSTS (Sep. 22, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/when-play-becomes-work-
are-college-athletes-employees [https://perma.cc/9B73-8D6F] (noting that, in 1986, “Congress 
explicitly limited the scope of qualified expenses to deny the exclusion for amounts received as 
room, board, and other living expenses”). 
 84 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (as amended in 1985). According to at least one scholar on the 
topic, it is believed that the underlying rationale to this distinction was that, in the early days of the 
tax code, “most scholarships [outside of the employment context] were given by local business 
leagues, charitable organizations, and education institutions themselves” and thus these scholar-
ships were perhaps seen as akin to gifts. Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income 
Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 67 (1991). Although the nature of many scholarships is quite 
different today, the general treatment of scholarships has not changed because this tax deduction 
encourages the pursuit of education, and, furthermore, excluding such amounts from taxation is 
consistent with a general social welfare policy of “treat[ing] those individuals receiving scholar-
ships equal to those receiving educational advantages from their environment.” Id. at 75, 103. 
 85 See infra notes 86–109 and accompanying text. 
 86 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 757 (1969) (noting that, under a predecessor version of 
the tax code, that under the taxpayer’s scholarship, the taxpayer, who was an engineer at Westing-
house, was “obligated to return to Westinghouse’s employ for a substantial period of time”). 
 87 Id.; see also Crane, supra note 84, at 104 (explaining that, based on the interpretation in 
Bingler and subsequent cases, “[n]o longer can any services be made an express condition of 
scholarships exempt under section 117” and “[h]owever, the statute sets forth no standard to apply 
when there is no such express condition and a student both works for and seeks scholarship aid 
from a single institution”); cf. id. at 105 (concluding that “in many instances, the line between 
merit and services can be a fine one, even at the undergraduate level” and pointing to the engage-
ment in an extracurricular activity in exchange for a scholarship as perhaps, in the author’s opin-
ion, blurring the line). 
 88 See ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (Joseph M. Perillo ed. 2017) 
(describing one definition of a contract to constitute a relation between parties to exchange and con-
trasting such definitions with gifts); Frequently Asked Questions of Gift Taxes, IRS, https://www.
irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-gift-taxes [https://
perma.cc/R3R9-28LK] (last updated Apr. 10, 2017) (explaining that a “gift” is “[a]ny transfer to an 
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Similarly, in 1969, in Proskey v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court ex-
plored the outermost limits of the definition of a “qualified scholarship” in 
the context of a resident physician at a university hospital.89 In Proskey, the 
court held that a cash stipend the University of Michigan had paid to one of 
its resident physicians was taxable under the U.S. tax code because the phy-
sician’s primary responsibilities—diagnosing patients and prescribing 
treatment—were not related to his own education.90 Although the U.S. Tax 
Court recognized that the resident physician had teaching responsibilities at 
the University of Michigan’s medical school, these teaching responsibilities 
were performed under the “constant direction and control” of the resident 
physician’s hospital, and the resident physician “was not free to pursue 
studies or research of his choice.”91 
The previous year, in Zolnay v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held 
that the annual cash payment of $9,600 from a university laboratory to an 
Ohio State University Ph.D student who performed lab research constituted 
compensation for services and was not an excludable scholarship or fellow-
ship under the U.S. tax code.92 In Zolnay, the court noted that the laboratory 
worker was paid a salary on par with university professors, and that he had 
worked in the laboratory for upwards of forty hours per week—far longer 
than was needed to meet any obligations related to his Ph.D. program.93 
Furthermore, the laboratory worker’s payment came in the form of cash, 
and his pay was not allocated to any direct costs pertaining to Ohio State 
University.94 The laboratory worker even continued to perform the same work 
and receive the same paycheck after he withdrew from the university.95 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the court rulings in Bingler, Proskey, and 
Zolnay, a 1977 IRS ruling concluded that under the “student-athlete” ama-
teurism model, “[t]he value of athletic scholarships, which may not exceed 
expenses for tuition, fees, room, board, and necessary supplies . . . is ex-
cludable from the recipient’s gross income” as long as the scholarship offer 
remains binding irrespective of whether the student ultimately chooses to 
                                                                                                                           
individual, either directly or indirectly, where full consideration (measured in money or money’s 
worth) is not received in return” and that where there is a tax on such gift, “[t]he donor is generally 
responsible for paying the gift tax”). 
 89 51 T.C. 918, 923–24 (1969). 
 90 See id. at 923 (explaining further that the University of Michigan Hospital was “not operat-
ed primarily as an institution for teaching”). 
 91Id. at 924. 
 92 See 49 T.C. 389, 399 (1968). 
 93 See id. at 397–98. 
 94 See generally id. (explaining that taxpayer’s use of his stipend for every day financial sup-
port, unrelated to his supposed studies, cut in favor the IRS’s argument the stipends were compen-
sation for work). 
 95 See id. at 398. 
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participate in his sport.96 The ruling further explains that if an “athletic 
scholarship” was crafted to make scholarship money contingent upon the 
athlete actually competing in his sport or fulfilling some other legal re-
quirement, then the IRS would instead treat the “scholarship” as a quid pro 
quo, and thus it would not be excludable from “gross income.”97 
There are several ways to reconcile the favorable tax treatment of athlet-
ic scholarships by the IRS with the adverse court rulings in Bingler, Proskey 
and Zolnay.98 First, as articulated by the IRS, traditional athletic scholarships 
at the time were perceived as binding even if an athlete were to quit his 
team.99 Thus, the athletic scholarships in question were not tied to performing 
in any particular athletic activity.100 By contrast, in Bingler, Proskey, and 
Zolnay, the recipients’ scholarships were contingent upon either contempora-
neous or future work.101 Thus, the scholarship came far closer to representing 
one side of a quid pro quo.102 
In addition to the difference in the binding nature of the scholarships, 
recipients of college athletic scholarships generally maintain full discretion 
to choose their courses based on personal interests.103 Indeed, NCAA Divi-
sion I athletes have held majors as varied as aeronautics, linguistics, and 
medical anthropology.104 By contrast, the scholarship recipients in Bingler 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. 
 97 Id. Since the 1977 ruling, many colleges have moved to one-year scholarships that are not 
renewed if an athlete quits, plays poorly, or is injured. Even absent a “pay for play” model, these 
scholarships may reasonably fail under the test for “qualified scholarships” under § 117 of the tax 
code. See Jon Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-Year Athletic Scholarships, but Many Don’t, 
CBS SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-give-
out-4-year-athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont [https://web.archive.org/web/20160612091032/http://
www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-give-out-4-year-athletic-scholarships-but-
many-dont] (explaining that for many years leading up to 2012 the NCAA banned multi-year 
scholarships, and, since 2012, the NCAA reinstated multi-year scholarships but have made them 
optional for member colleges). 
 98 See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 757; Proskey, 51 T.C. at 923; Zolnay, 49 T.C. at 399. 
 102 See generally supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that a quid pro quo is 
often associated with a contractual arrangement). 
 103 See generally David Biderman, Why Football Players Don’t Speak Spanish, WALL 
STREET J. (Sept. 16, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487037435
04575493773613076844 [https://web.archive.org/web/20150115193525/https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748703743504575493773613076844] (discussing the range of subjects in 
which college football players choose to major). 
 104 See Ava, 15 Athletes with Incredibly Weird Degrees, THE SPORTSTER (Jun. 28, 2015), http://
www.thesportster.com/entertainment/top-15-athletes-with-incredibly-weird-degrees [https://perma.
cc/6YJX-YFV5] (mentioning that NFL player Cameron Fleming studied aeronautics at Stanford 
University, former NBA player Dikembe Mutumbo studied linguistics at Georgetown University, 
and former NFL player Myron Rolle studied medical anthropology at Florida State University). 
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and Proskey had limited, if any, discretion in choosing their courses.105 The 
subject matter was determined by their employer for the purpose of improv-
ing the services that the scholarship recipients provided to their employer.106 
Finally, the athletic scholarships described in the IRS’s 1977 ruling 
provided athletes with in-kind educational and living benefits rather than 
cash payments.107 By contrast, the payments in Proskey and Zolnay were 
cash payments.108 While the U.S. tax code does not expressly delineate be-
tween in-kind benefits and the receipt of cash, the former is implicitly pre-
ferred for tax purposes because it is less likely that in-kind benefits would 
serve as a disguise for additional salary.109 
2. Section 127: Exemption for Educational Assistance Paid by Employer 
Additionally, § 127 of the IRC allows employees to exclude up to 
$5,250 from their gross income per year in educational assistance, paid by 
an employer toward one’s undergraduate education, if the employer main-
tains a written educational assistance plan.110 Under this section of the tax 
code, employees may use the $5,250 exclusion amount, unless otherwise 
restricted by the company’s educational assistance plan, toward tuition and 
fees, as well as books, supplies, and equipment.111 An employee may quali-
fy for a § 127 exemption irrespective of whether the intended course of 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742 (noting that the scholarship at issue in Bingler was limited in 
availability to “postgraduate study in engineering, physics, or mathematics”—all subjects that 
would relate to employment subsequent to competing the program); Proskey, 51 T.C. at 923 (con-
cluding that the “the broad scope of the services [petitioner] was required to perform” was an 
“important indication that petitioner’s activities at University Hospital . . . were geared not to 
study and research but to the operational needs of University Hospital”). 
 106 See generally Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742 (noting the subject matter related to the recipient’s 
would-be engineering job at Westinghouse upon program completion). 
 107 See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (describing the traditional athletic scholarship pro-
vided directly by a college to its athletes, primarily in the form of in-kind benefits such as free 
tuition). 
 108 See Proskey, 51 T.C. at 919 (describing the disputed “scholarship” related to a cash sti-
pend that the recipient taxpayer wished to exclude from gross income, rather than the receipt of in-
kind benefits); Zolnay, 49 T.C. at 389 (describing the disputed “scholarship” as a $9,600 payment 
from the university’s Electro-Science laboratory). 
109 See Proskey, 51 T.C. at 919 (explaining the cash nature of taxpayer’s “stipend” lent credi-
bility to the argument the cash was compensation for services). 
 110 See I.R.C. § 127; see also Crane, supra note 84, at 108 (“An employer can provide up to 
$5,250 of educational assistance each calendar year to an employee if the assistance is provided 
under a nondiscriminatory program.”); Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The Current Landscape 
of the Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform, 2010 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1047, 1087–88 (noting that nothing in § 127 precludes taxpayers from deducting 
amounts exceeding the $5,250 threshold so long as such expenses “qualify as a working condition 
fringe benefit”). 
 111 I.R.C. § 127(c). 
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study is job-related.112 However, the § 127 exemption does not include any 
tax exemption for “education involving sports, games, hobbies (unless job-
related), meals, lodging or transportation.”113 
3. Section 132: Exempted Fringe Benefits 
Section 132 of the IRC, meanwhile, excludes from “gross income” any 
fringe benefits offered by employers that constitute one of the following 
categories: (1) no-additional-cost services; (2) qualified employee dis-
counts; (3) working condition fringe benefits; and (4) de minimis fringe 
benefits.114 
A “no-additional-cost service” includes any service provided by an 
employer to an employee if “(1) such service is offered for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of the line of business of the employer in which 
the employee is performing services, and (2) the employer incurs no sub-
stantial additional cost (including forgone revenue) in providing such ser-
vice to the employee . . . .”115 One example of a “no-additional-cost ser-
vice” is an airline carrier’s policy of “allowing employees to fly free-of-
charge on fights having empty seats.”116 Other examples of no-additional-
cost services include “excess capacity services” such as hotel accommoda-
tions, commercial bus or train tickets, use of entertainment facilities, and 
free communication services for employees of the telephone company.117 
 A “qualified employee discount,” meanwhile, includes:  
 
[A]ny employee discount with respect to qualified property or 
services to the extent such discount does not exceed (A) in the 
case of property, the gross profit percentage of the price at which 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Lazar, supra note 110, at 1088–89. 
 113 I.R.C. § 127(c)(1); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FRINGE BENEFIT GUIDE 79 (2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5137.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LBX-MKFF]. 
 114 I.R.C. § 132 (also exempting, under this section of the tax code, qualified transportation 
fringe benefits, qualified moving expense reimbursement, qualified retirement planning services, 
and qualified military base realignment and closure fringe benefits); see also Bertrand M. Harding 
Jr., Taxation, in COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 10–11 (2013) (discuss-
ing the application of § 132 in the context of higher education); Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing In-
ternal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25 VA. TAX REV. 977, 980–81 (2006) (ex-
plaining that “[a] leading dictionary in current use identifies the term ‘fringe benefit’ as of U.S. 
origin and defines it as ‘a perquisite or belief of some kind provided by an employer to supple-
ment a money wage or salary’”) (citing 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 200 (2d ed. 1989)).  
 115 I.R.C. § 132(b)(1)–(2). 
 116 ALAN D. BERKOWITZ, 11 WEST’S PA. FORMS, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12.40, Westlaw (da-
tabase updated Aug. 2017). 
 117 See WILLIAM P. STRENG & MICKEY R. DAVIS, TAX PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT ¶ 6.03 
(2017) (internal quotations omitted); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 18. 
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the property is being offered by the employer to customers, or (B) 
in the case of services, 20 percent of the price at which the ser-
vices are being offered by the employer to customers.118 
 
Similarly, a “working condition fringe” consists of “any property or services 
provided to an employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee 
paid for such property of services, such payment would be allowable for 
deduction [as a trade or business expense or as depreciation].”119 For exam-
ple, according to the 2014 IRS Fringe Benefit Guide, an employee may ex-
empt from his gross income as a “working condition fringe” a free educa-
tion if the education “improves or develops the job-related capabilities of an 
employee.”120 This may include the receipt of an undergraduate or advanced 
degree needed to retain one’s job or pay level, as long as the degree does 
not prepare an employee to enter a new trade or business.121 
Finally, a “de minimis fringe” benefit includes “any property or service 
the value of which is . . . so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable 
or administratively impracticable.”122 For example, dinner money and local 
transportation fare are two examples of de minimis fringe benefits, as long 
as the benefits are not provided on a daily basis.123 In addition, the IRC spe-
cifically includes as a de minimis fringe benefit “the operation by an em-
ployer of any eating facility for employees” so long as “such facility is lo-
cated on or near the business premises of the employer” and “revenue de-
rived from such facility normally equals or exceeds the direct operating 
costs of such facility.”124 
                                                                                                                           
 118 I.R.C. § 132(c)(1). 
 119 Id. § 132(d). 
 120 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 75; see also id. at 76 (explaining that “[f]or 
educational reimbursement to qualify as a working condition fringe benefit, the education must be 
job-related,” and that “[i]t is not required that the employer have a written plan or dollar limita-
tions, and the employer may discriminate in favor of highly-compensated employees”). 
 121 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 76. 
 122 I.R.C. § 132(e)(1). 
 123 BERKOWITZ, supra note 116; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 4 
(explaining that when certain benefits such as meal money are provided on a daily basis they are 
not de minimis, and explaining the distinction is that some exempt benefits are “not routine”); id. 
at 15 (“Regularly-provided meal money does not qualify for the exclusion for de minimis fringe 
benefits provided by an employer. Occasional meal money can meet an exception and be excluda-
ble, if the following three conditions are met: [occasional basis, provided for overtime work, and 
enables overtime work].”). 
 124 I.R.C. § 132(e)(2). 
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4. Section 119: Meals and Lodging for the Convenience of the Employer 
Section 119 of the IRC, meanwhile, allows for an individual to exclude 
from gross income any “meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of 
the employer.”125 Under this section of the tax code, meals are excludable 
in-kind benefits if they are provided “on the employer’s business premises” 
and “for the employer’s convenience.”126 Similarly, lodging is excludable 
from wages if the lodging is provided on the employer’s business premises, 
for the employer’s convenience, and as a condition of employment.127 
The IRC does not provide an exclusive list of jobs that allow employ-
ees to receive tax-free lodging.128 Nevertheless, the IRS Fringe Benefits 
Guide lists some common examples of professions where lodging is gener-
ally excludable, such as: “park rangers, firefighters or apartment manag-
ers.”129 These are all jobs where living in close proximity to one’s work is 
essential for performing one’s job appropriately.130 
5. Section 162(a): Trade or Business Expenses Deduction 
Lastly, § 162(a) of the U.S. tax code states that, where an individual 
pays certain expenses, “[t]here shall be allowed as a [tax] deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business.”131 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained 
in its 1987 decision in Commissioner v. Groetzinger, to constitute “carrying 
on any trade or business,” an individual “must be involved in the activity 
with continuity and regularity and . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for 
engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.”132 While a tax deduc-
tion for out-of-pocket expenses is not as valuable as the opportunity to ex-
clude in-kind benefits from gross income, § 162(a) still provides meaning-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See I.R.C. § 119(a)–(b); see also Harding, supra note 114, at 12. 
 126 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 43. 
 127 Id. at 47. 
 128 See id. at 49. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See generally id. (explaining examples of when a profession may require someone to live 
on or near their place of work). 
 131 I.R.C. § 162(a); see also Kopaigora v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2016-35, 2016 WL 
4094723, at *3 (T.C. Aug. 2, 2016) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)); Ford v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 
1300, 1305 (1971), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (explaining how analysis of 
a business deduction begins by examining whether the taxpayer was engaged in a particular trade 
or business, and whether the expenditure was directly related to that trade or business); Lazar, 
supra note 110, at 1053–54 (discussing the implications of § 162(a) in terms of deducting the cost 
of education as a business expense). 
 132 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
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ful benefits for those who are either self-employed or have an employer 
who does not cover all of their business expenses.133 
As a general matter, § 162(a) of the tax code is commonly used to de-
duct expenses such as one’s home office, business phone and utilities, pro-
fessional publications, office supplies, and business travels.134 Nevertheless, 
this deduction is also available for educational expenses where the expenses 
are incurred in connection with carrying on a trade or business, are not re-
quired to meet the minimum threshold of a taxpayer’s trade or business, and 
do not lead to the qualification of a taxpayer in a new trade or business.135 
Numerous court decisions have assessed whether, under particular sce-
narios, individuals may deduct their non-scholarship educational expenses 
from their taxable income.136 For example, in its 1950 decision Hill v. 
Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether a taxpayer who taught high school English in Virginia may deduct 
from her tax returns the cost of taking summer classes at Columbia Univer-
sity in the subjects of short-story writing and abnormal psychology.137 In 
reaching a favorable conclusion for the taxpayer, the court emphasized that 
the Virginia State Board of Education required teachers to complete one of 
several forms of continuing education, and that acquiring college credits 
falls within those permissible forms.138 Thus, the teacher’s coursework at 
Columbia University represented a good faith trade or business expense.139 
Similarly, in 1973, in Ford v. Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a U.S. Tax Court decision that allowed an Eng-
lish teacher to deduct the costs related to his one year of graduate studies in 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See infra notes 134–148 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (stating acceptable business expenses); 25 Common Business 
Deductions and Expenses, STAPLES, http://www.staples.com/sbd/content/open/deductions.html 
[https://perma.cc/79VA-NZN7] (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).  
 135 See Lazar, supra note 110, at 1054 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also 
Kopaigora, 2016 WL 4094723, at *2 (“Education expenses are deductible if they satisfy the gen-
eral requirements under section 162 as well as the specific requirements under the regulations. 
Section 162 requires a taxpayer to be presently engaged in a trade or business in order for educa-
tion expenses to be deductible.”)  
 136 See infra notes 137–148 and accompanying text. 
 137 See 181 F.2d 906, 906–08, 911 (4th Cir. 1950). 
 138 See id. at 909 (explaining that “the very logic of the situation here shows that [the taxpay-
er] went to Columbia to maintain her present position; not to attain a new position; to preserve not 
expand or increase; to carry on, not to commence”). The court further concluded that it made no 
difference that the taxpayer admitted to enjoying her summer courses, as the test for an “ordinary 
and necessary” business expense turns on the business relevance of the activity, and not whether 
the activity was separately enjoyable. See generally id. (holding that the taxpayer’s admission that 
she enjoyed the courses as irrelevant to the issue of tax deductibility given that they served a busi-
ness purpose in allowing her to carry out her current line of work). 
 139 See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
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anthropology at the University of Oslo—studies that included courses taken 
in English, Spanish, and social studies.140 The U.S. Tax Court originally had 
held that the teacher’s program of study in Ford was deductible because the 
“study in anthropology and linguistics was appropriate and helpful, and did 
in fact improve [the taxpayer’s] skills in teaching English, social studies, 
and Spanish.”141 The court further pointed out that the study did not prepare 
the taxpayer for a new line of work, but related specifically to his current 
field of employment.142 
Likewise, in 1968, in Furner v. Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a junior high school social studies 
teacher who resigned from her school system to pursue a year of full-time 
graduate study in history may deduct the costs of her studies because they 
were a normal incident of carrying on the business of teaching.143 In Fur-
ner, the court also held it immaterial that the junior high school social stud-
ies teacher had quit her teaching job to pursue the studies.144 Importantly, 
the court held that the teacher intended to return to her profession upon the 
completion of her year’s study.145 
Finally, in its 2016 decision of Kopaigora v. Commissioner, the U.S. 
Tax Court allowed an accounting professional to deduct his tuition, travel 
costs, and meals related to an Executive M.B.A. program at Brigham Young 
University.146 The Kopaigora decision expressed no concern that the tax-
payer’s deductions included more than $18,000 for one year’s tuition, nor 
that the taxpayer travelled across state lines to attend his classes.147 All that 
mattered was that the expenses actually met the requirements of the particu-
lar tax deduction.148 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Ford v. Comm’r (Ford II), 487 F.2d 1025, 1025–1026 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Ford 
v. Comm’r (Ford I), 56 T.C. 1300, 1301 (1971) aff’d 487 F.2d at 1025–1026.  
 141 Ford I, 56 T.C. at 1306. 
 142 See id. at 1304 (providing “evidence of [the taxpayer’s] continuing active participation in 
the teaching profession”). 
 143 393 F.2d 292, 292 (7th Cir. 1968). 
 144 Id. at 295 (rejecting the tax court’s finding of evidence to support the conclusion that the 
taxpayer did not plan to return to teaching at the conclusion of her studies). 
 145Id.  
 146 2016 WL 4094723, at *1–2. 
 147 Id. at *2. 
 148 See id. 
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III. HOW COLLEGES MIGHT PROVIDE THEIR ATHLETES WITH BONA FIDE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WITHOUT RISKING THE TAX-EXEMPT  
STATUS OF ATHLETES’ SCHOLARSHIPS 
Section A of this Part discusses how, based upon the foregoing, it 
seems likely that colleges, with proper tax planning, could pay their athletes 
without compromising the tax-exempt status of the athletes’ scholarships.149 
Section B of this Part explores the numerous ways colleges could structure 
athlete compensation to conform to the rules under the U.S. tax code for 
tax-exempt education.150 
A. “Pay for Play” Athletes and the “Qualified Scholarship” Exemption 
To begin with the simplest alternative, colleges likely may continue to 
offer their “pay for play” athletes “qualified scholarships” under § 117 of the 
tax code as long as the colleges do not place any express conditions on these 
scholarships.151 For example, this means that the colleges would need to al-
low their “pay for play” athletes to keep their scholarships even if these ath-
letes breach their “pay for play” agreements, or otherwise quit their sport.152 
Structuring athlete scholarships in this guaranteed manner would seem 
to present some financial risk to colleges.153 For example, a college athlete 
could conceivably quit after receiving a scholarship and enjoy four years of 
free tuition without providing any benefit to the college athletic program for 
which he was given a scholarship.154 Nevertheless, this risk seems rather 
low under a “pay for play” model because paid, elite college athletes would 
still have a financial incentive to perform in their sports.155 Indeed, the most 
likely candidates to take advantage of a guaranteed four-year scholarship 
without participating in their intended sport would be athletes who decide to 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See infra notes 151–164 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 165–197 and accompanying text. 
 151 See I.R.C. § 117(a)–(d) (2012) (qualified scholarships). 
 152 Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. 
 153 See Solomon, supra note 97 (explaining that many colleges do not like to give athletes 
four-year guaranteed athletic scholarships because they “complained that players were accepting 
these deals and not playing” and “[s]chools wanted a two-way street”). 
 154 See id. 
 155 This financial incentive would result from the reality that, even though the athletes’ schol-
arship was guaranteed and non-rescindable, the athletes’ pay, as part of an employment contract, 
would be contingent upon work performed. While it is theoretically true that a college athlete 
could enjoy his free scholarship while “holding out” on athletic performance for a higher paying 
salary, such “hold out” scenario is unlikely given the limited length of the college football season, 
the limited number of years college athletes maintain eligibility, and that athletes may have some 
incentive to both showcase their talent and not engage in “hold out” practices to avoid scaring off 
potential future NFL and NBA employers. 
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focus on an educational pursuit other than professional sports during the 
course of their college experience.156 Generally, the loss of these athletes do 
not represent substantial harm to college athletic programs. 
In addition to § 117’s requirement that an athlete’s scholarship be non-
contingent, colleges also would need to ensure their “pay for play” athletes 
maintain complete control over their course of study to avoid the appear-
ance of improper employer control or oversight.157 Thus, colleges should 
implement firewalls between their athletic departments and their course ad-
visors to ensure that athletes are not impermissibly influenced by the athlet-
ic department in their course selection.158 
In a similar vein, colleges that seek to offer “qualified scholarships” to 
“pay for play” athletes must ensure that their athletes are provided with 
scholarships in the form of in-kind benefits rather than cash.159 The im-
portance of not providing “pay for play” athletes with cash scholarships 
emerges from the U.S. Tax Court’s rulings in Proskey v. Commissioner and 
Zolnay v. Commissioner—each of which, at least implicitly, viewed the 
payment of a cash stipend as hindering an individual taxpayer’s “qualified 
scholarship” argument.160 
Finally, wherever possible, it is advantageous for a college to provide 
its “pay for play” athletes with scholarships in the same format and on the 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See generally Ben Shumate, 30 Percent of Athletes Quit Respective Teams, BROWN DAILY 
HERALD (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.browndailyherald.com/2016/04/28/30-percent-of-athletes-
quit-respective-teams [https://perma.cc/W54B-SHQD] (concluding that about thirty percent of 
students that arrive at Brown University as college athletes—about eighty students out of 260—
leave their sports team before their senior season). 
 157 See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) (as amended in 1985) (explaining that to constitute a 
“qualified scholarship” the primary purpose must be “to further the education and training of the 
recipient in his individual capacity” and too much oversight over how a recipient were to use their 
scholarship may begin to step beyond the “individual capacity” and into an employee capacity). 
 158 See Proskey v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 918, 924 (1969) (explaining how the taxpayer was not 
able to pursue his own course of study because of the supervision of the hospital where he 
worked); see also Marc Edelman, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old 
Wounds, and Preventing New Ones, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 601, 638 (2008) (explaining how fire-
walls are used “to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information” between parties); Definition of 
Firewall, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/firewall.asp [https://perma.cc/
X3UZ-4894] (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (explaining that “[a] firewall is a legal barrier preventing 
the transference of inside information”). It is worth noting that the NCAA already requires such 
firewalls to a limited extent, as indicated by association rules that limit a single faculty member, 
the Faculty Athletics Representative to handling interactions between the athletic department and 
the faculty related to college athletes’ obligations and in-class performance. See generally MI-
CHAEL A. MIRANDA & THOMAS S. PASKUS, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, ROLES, RE-
SPONSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES OF NCAA FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES 10 
(2013), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/FAR_STUDY_Report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BQ3B-HTVF]. 
 159 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Proskey, 51 T.C. at 924–26; Zolnay v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 389, 398 (1968). 
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same terms as non-athletes’ scholarships.161 Where college athletes other-
wise qualify for pure academic scholarships, colleges should provide ath-
letes with traditional academic scholarships.162 Similarly, where athletes 
otherwise qualify for state tuition assistance programs, colleges should help 
the athletes to obtain these other forms of aid.163 At highly endowed colleg-
es that offer free college attendance to students from low-income families, 
athletes who qualify under this basis should receive free tuition this way, 
rather than through special athletic scholarships.164 
B. Alternative Tax Reductions under “Pay for Play” 
Furthermore, even if some college athletes would not meet the re-
quirements for a “qualified scholarship” exemption, there are still other 
ways that colleges may assist their “pay for play” athletes in achieving 
meaningful tax savings on their education.165 
1. Devising an Educational Assistance Program that Benefits College 
Athletes 
Aside from the “qualified scholarship” exemption, colleges can pro-
vide employee-athletes with some tax relief for their education by offering 
the education though a formal “educational assistance program,” as articu-
lated by § 127 of the tax code.166 In some ways, the U.S. tax code’s educa-
tional assistance exemption is more flexible than the “qualified scholarship” 
exemption because it allows recipients to accept the exemption as a quid pro 
quo for services rendered.167 In addition, the recipient of educational assis-
tance may choose courses that are either related or unrelated to their jobs.168 
                                                                                                                           
 161 The reason being that, this reduces the argument that the scholarships are simply “pay for 
play” and thus relate to some form of an implied-in-fact contract. See supra notes 85–87 and ac-
companying text. 
 162 See I.R.C. § 117. Providing conventional academic scholarships in lieu of athletic scholar-
ships removes any problems related to student-athletes rendering services to their college or uni-
versity. See id.; Solomon, supra note 97. 
 163 Cf. 160 Cong. Rec. S2362–66 (noting that under the current college sports business model 
that disallows pay to athletes, approximately forty percent of college athletes qualify for Pell 
grants). 
 164 See Jonathan Ping, Stanford Offers Free Tuition to Low and Middle-Income Families, MY 
MONEY BLOG (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.mymoneyblog.com/stanford-offers-free-tuition-to-low-
and-middle-income-families.html [https://perma.cc/TBW9-473D]. 
 165 See infra notes 166–197 and accompanying text. 
 166 See I.R.C. § 127. 
 167 Compare id. (discussing the “educational assistance program”, with id. § 117 (discussing 
“qualified scholarships”). 
 168 See id. § 127. 
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Nevertheless, one of the major drawbacks of “pay for play” athletes re-
lying on the educational assistance exemption is that the exemption caps 
excludable educational expenses at $5,250 per year.169 Even for students at 
state colleges that offer in-state tuition discounts, this exemption would rea-
sonably cover the costs of approximately six to eighteen annual credit 
hours.170 Thus, as long as the NCAA Division I rules continue to require 
college athletes to complete at least six credit hours per term (plus, make 
continued annual progress toward graduating), “pay for play” college ath-
letes who receive in-kind tuition benefits exclusively under this section 
would still suffer a major shortfall.171 
Furthermore, the educational assistance exemption does not apply to 
meals or lodging.172 Thus, athletes who rely on the § 127 exemption would 
need to simultaneously rely upon § 119 of the code to exclude any meals 
provided by their athletic department employer.173 If a college wishes to 
provide free meals to its “pay for play” athletes, the college should offer 
these meals on their premises, ideally at the college’s athletic facilities.174 
The college should also ensure the meals are selected and prepared with the 
aid of a nutritionist to help ensure athletes’ peak performances in their 
sport.175 Doing so would help to support the argument that the meal provi-
                                                                                                                           
 169 See id.; see also Crane, supra note 84, at 108 (“An employer can provide up to $5,250 of 
educational assistance each calendar year to an employee if the assistance is provided under a 
nondiscriminatory policy.”); Lazar, supra note 110, at 1087–88 (2010) (noting that that nothing in 
§ 127 precludes taxpayers from deducting amounts exceeding the $5,250 threshold so long as such 
expenses “qualify as a working condition fringe benefit”). 
 170 On one end of spectrum, Baruch College, which is part of the City University of New 
York, offers one of the nation’s lowest in-state tuitions at $285/credit hour; this means at the 
$5,250 threshold, the educational assistance exemption cover 18.4 credit hours of education, less 
the costs of student services and other fees. See Tuition and Fee Information, BARUCH COLLEGE, 
https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/tuition/#costs [https://perma.cc/WB84-9BNC] (last visited Aug. 12, 
2017). On the other end of the spectrum, the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor charges in-state 
tuition to upperclassmen at its undergraduate business school $1,158 for the first hour and $782 
for each additional hour; this means at the $5,250 threshold, the educational assistance exemption 
would cover just 6.2 credit hours of tuition. See Tuition and Registration Fees, UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN, http://www.ro.umich.edu/tuition/tuition-fees.php [https://perma.cc/9TZA-SC8T] (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2017).  
 171 See Staying on Track to Graduate, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/
staying-track-graduate [https://perma.cc/6HLH-TJLC] (last visited Aug. 11, 2017). 
 172 See I.R.C. § 127(c)(1)(B). 
 173 See id. § 119. 
 174 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 43–44 (explaining that for meals to 
qualify as tax-exempt, they must be provided “on the employer’s business premises” and “for the 
employer’s convenience”). 
 175 See Paul Myerberg, NCAA Schools Put Money Where Athletes’ Mouths Are, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 26, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/04/26/unlimited-food-
snacks-wisconsin-oregon-ncaa-student-athletes/26405105 [https://perma.cc/W9YB-X5KH] (discuss-
ing how, because the NCAA lifted its restriction on the amount and type of food colleges may pro-
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sions are truly “for the convenience of the employer” and not simply a form 
of latent compensation.176 
With respect to attempting to provide employee-athletes with tax-free 
lodging benefits under § 119, the arguments for this tax exclusion are com-
paratively more dubious.177 It would be a stretch to compare college ath-
letes’ need for lodging with the lodging needs of those in professions where 
services are occasionally required in the middle of the night such as “park 
rangers, firefighters, or apartment managers.”178 Nevertheless, given the 
very early morning practices and unusual late night travel required of some 
college sports teams, one might be able to argue that this exemption would 
apply to the in-kind benefit of free housing if the housing is located next to 
either the gymnasium or near the airport (for road games requiring air trav-
el).179 
2. Offering Free Education to Athletes as a Fringe Benefit 
Yet another way for colleges to provide their “pay for play” athletes 
with free in-kind tuition would entail applying the fringe benefit provisions 
of § 132 of the tax code.180 While a free education does not generally con-
stitute a fringe benefit, the January 2014 IRS Fringe Benefit Guide recog-
nizes that employee-athletes may be able to exempt the cost of their free 
educations from gross income as a “working condition fringe” as long as 
the courses selected “improve[] or develop[] the job-related capabilities” of 
the employee-athlete.181 
Alternatively, even if the free education is not job-related, there still 
may be a reasonable argument that the free education constitutes a “no-
                                                                                                                           
vide to their athletes, schools such as the University of Wisconsin and the University of Oregon have 
used the universities’ nutrition staffs to ensure athletes are being provided with the types of food to 
improve their on-field performance). 
 176 See I.R.C. § 119. 
 177 See infra notes 178–179 and accompanying text; see also I.R.C. § 119. 
 178 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 49. 
 179 See I.R.C. § 119; see also Nikki Chavanelle, A Day in the Life of a Division I Athlete, 
DAILY CAMPUS (Mar. 5, 2015, 7:38 PM), http://www.smudailycampus.com/sports/a-day-in-the-
life-of-a-division-i-athlete [https://perma.cc/95F8-NFBB] (describing the day of a college athlete, 
whose day begins with waking up at 5:30 a.m. for practice at 6 a.m.); Laura Pappano, How Big-
Time Sports Ate College Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/
education/edlife/how-big-time-sports-ate-college-life.html [https://perma.cc/X3H5-AQ52] (quoting a 
2008 report by the Duke University athletics department that described how athletes, who often 
play in evening road games, “‘are required to board a flight at 2 a.m., arriving back at their dorms 
at 4 or 5 a.m., and then are expected to go to class, study and otherwise act as if it were a normal 
school day’”). 
 180 See I.R.C. § 132. 
 181 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 76. 
1166 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1137 
  
additional-cost service.”182 Although one most often thinks about free air-
line tickets and hotel rooms when considering “no-additional-cost services,” 
enrollment in college courses generally fits the same criteria because col-
leges bear little, if any, variable costs to adding a few additional students 
into a course that fails to otherwise achieve full enrollment.183 Indeed, most 
college professors, subject to special exceptions, are paid based on the 
number of credits they teach and not the number of students.184 
Nevertheless, to make an employee-athlete’s free education truly con-
form to the tax code’s description of a “no-additional-cost service,” colleges 
would need to make some changes in their method of enrolling athletes into 
courses.185 For example, employee-athletes that want their educational ben-
efits to qualify as “no-additional-cost services” would need to enroll in their 
classes after all of the paying students have chosen their classes.186 This 
way, the college athletes that seek this exemption are only able to enroll in 
courses where there truly is additional capacity and little, if any, variable 
costs to the college related to their enrollment.187 
3. Allowing Athletes to Pay for College Themselves and Then Take the 
Costs as a Trade or Business Deduction 
Finally, the most elite college athletes—those who would earn substan-
tial income under “pay for play” (whether from their colleges or through 
third-party endorsements)—may be able to argue that the cost of their edu-
cation is a “trade or business expense” under § 162(a) of the tax code.188 
Case law seems to support the possibility that the personal payment of 
a college education represents a deductible business expense as long as the 
“pay for play” athlete’s educational expenses meet three criteria.189 These 
criteria include: (1) the expenses are incurred in connection with carrying 
on a trade or business; (2) the expenses are not required to meet the mini-
                                                                                                                           
 182 I.R.C. § 132(b)(1)–(2). 
 183 See id.; see also BERKOWITZ, supra note 116 (describing airline tickets as the classic ex-
ample of a no-additional-cost service); Martin Saiz, Economies of Scale and Large Classes, 
THOUGHT & ACTION 149, 149 (Fall 2014), https://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/t-SF_Saiz.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8G7-NRQM] (describing how public universities save money with larger class 
sizes given the very low variable costs associated with increasing the number of students in a 
given classroom). 
 184 Saiz, supra note 183, at 149.  
 185 See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 186 See BERKOWITZ, supra note 116 (noting that to qualify as a no-additional-cost service, the 
provided service must represent additional capacity that the provider would not otherwise be able 
to sell). 
 187 See I.R.C. § 132 (b)(1); BERKOWITZ, supra note 116. 
 188 See I.R.C. § 162(a). 
 189 See supra note 131–148 and accompanying text. 
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mum threshold of a taxpayer’s trade or business, and (3) the expenses do 
not lead to the qualification of a taxpayer in a new trade or business.190 
“Pay for play” college athletes likely will meet the first and third crite-
ria as long as they pursue coursework directly related to their athletic en-
deavors.191 Majors such as sports management and kinesiology provide a 
relatively easy fit. Meanwhile, studies related to business, communications, 
and public speaking might also have a sufficient nexus to athletics. 
With respect to the second requirement of not meeting the minimum 
threshold of employment, on the one hand, if one were to look at the narrow 
profession of a collegiate athlete, it would seem difficult for a “pay for 
play” athlete to meet this requirement.192 This is because the NCAA cur-
rently requires all college athletes to be full-time students enrolled in the 
college for which they perform.193 Thus, unless the NCAA lifts this re-
quirement, one could reasonably presume that pursuing a college degree (al-
beit, not necessarily having completed one) is a “minimum threshold re-
quirement” to remain “employed.”194 
On the other hand, however, if one were to describe the “pay for play” 
athlete’s profession more generally as a professional athlete (rather than as a 
collegiate athlete), an athlete could make a far stronger argument that earn-
ing a degree is not required to meet the minimum threshold for his trade or 
business.195 Indeed, only fifty percent of professional football players (using 
NFL players as a relevant sample) and less than fifty percent of men’s pro-
fessional basketball players (using NBA players as a relevant sample) have 
a college degree.196 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that a college degree 
is not required in general to meet the minimum threshold for employment as 
either a football or men’s basketball player.197 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 76. 
 191 See infra note 195–197 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra note 193–194 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Division I Progress-Toward-Degree Requirements, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/division-i-progress-toward-degree-requirements [https://perma.cc/XGA7-YNKN] (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2017). 
 194 See I.R.C. § 162(a); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 113, at 77. 
 195 See infra note 196–197 and accompanying text. 
 196 See Valerie Strauss, Dear LeBron: Time to Get a College Degree (Other Big-Time Ath-
letes Did), WASH. POST (Jun. 17, 2014) (quoting Jonathan Abrams, N.B.A. Players Make Their 
Way Back to College, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2009)), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2014/06/17/dear-lebron-time-to-get-a-college-degree-other-big-time-athletes-did/?utm_
term=.8e5e43cefdf9 [https://perma.cc/MU82-TV2X]. 
 197 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is understandable why some university employees and congressmen 
have expressed trepidation about the movement to bring “pay for play” to 
college sports. If colleges with big-time athletics programs share their reve-
nues with athletes, it leaves less revenue for colleges to either reinvest into 
other programs or to allocate to school administrators, athletic directors or 
coaches. In addition, for those colleges that do not substantially profit from 
their football and men’s basketball programs, the “pay for play” model 
forces them to choose between forgoing the recruitment of elite athletes, 
cutting expenses in other ways, or potentially increasing operating losses.198 
Nevertheless, any attempts to use purported tax liability as the reason 
to avoid the “pay for play” model either misconstrues the plain meaning of 
the U.S. tax code or is simply disingenuous. Even if college sports were to 
move to a “pay for play” model, with careful tax planning, colleges could 
likely continue to provide their athletes with “qualified scholarships” under 
§ 117 of the U.S. tax code. In addition, colleges most likely could continue 
to offer their athletes tax savings through a formal “education assistance 
program” or by providing education as a “working condition fringe” or “no-
additional-cost service.” 
Based on the foregoing, there is reasonable uncertainty as to whether 
colleges that hire “pay for play” athletes would ever need to treat their ath-
letes’ free education as taxable. Thus, the argument that a “pay for play” 
model of college sports would transform all college athletic scholarships 
into taxable gains is far weaker than “pay for play” opponents would have 
people to believe. Although there may indeed be good faith reasons for the 
concern over shifting college sports to a “pay for play” model, claims that 
“pay for play” would impose colossal tax liability on college athletes are 
simply dubious. 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 14 (noting how less successful college sports 
programs such as Rutgers University have refused to make the choice to downgrade their athletic 
programs or offer less money to their coaches—thus causing these programs to operate at a loss, 
even without a free market to pay college athletes). 
